Within a higher-dimensional incomplete specialization Heckscher-Ohlin framework, we first develop a gravity model that views bilateral gravity equations as statistical relationships constrained on countries' multilateral specialization patterns. Second, we test our model empirically by using a uniquely detailed and large European data set. We show that trade in the parts and components of capital goods is driven by supply-side country differences relative to the rest of the world, compatible with models of incomplete specialization and trade. We take our results as evidence of the existence of international production networks in Europe, driven by trade-offs between wages and coordination costs.
Introduction and motivation
Worldwide trade in intermediate products was already identified in the early 1960's as a key part of international trade (Balassa, 1966) . Recent contributions have confirmed its increasing importance, specifically with respect to an important subset of intermediate gods: the parts and components of capital goods (Kimura et al., 2007; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) . A number of studies (a review is in the next section) potentially linked the trade in parts and components to the existence of global supply chains and adopted a gravity framework with a variety of trade determinants to analyze the phenomenon. In this paper we contribute to this literature in two ways.
First, within a higher-dimensional incomplete-specialization Heckscher-Ohlin framework we build a theory-guided gravity model with supply-side country-specific characteristics to identify driving forces for trade in parts and components. Second, we test our model empirically by using a uniquely detailed and large data set of European trade in the parts and components of capital goods. In accordance with the predictions of our model, we provide evidence that trade in the parts and components of capital goods across Europe, i.e., between East and West Europe, is driven by supply-side country differences relative to the rest of the world, compatible with models of incomplete specialization and trade. We take our results as evidence for the existence of international East-West production networks in Europe, driven by tradeoffs between wages and coordination costs.
The motivation for our paper comes from the simple idea of the specialization present at the intermediate step of production. We start with the notion of fragmentation that describes the deepening of the division of labor by horizontally or vertically splitting production processes into distinct tasks. A division of labor encourages specialization and fragmentation, thus further increasing incentives towards specialization. The realization of fragmentation-induced additional gains from specialization requires breaking up the spatial concentration of production that frequently happens on an international scale. Hence, firms specialize within the global supply chain, potentially by joining into international production networks or even by offshoring individual tasks.
Apart from the potential gains, fragmentation-induced specialization implies costs of coordination beyond the level of a single firm or plant. Coordination costs typically entail costs of investment, the customization of products upon demand, communication, and two-way trading of intermediate products. One would expect firms to join the global supply chain whenever fragmentation-induced specialization gains outweigh the implied coordination costs. Hence, the international scale of production networking should increase with fragmentation, with declining coordination costs, or with the strength of international incentives to specialize.
On the country level, fragmentation-driven trade is reflected by vertical specialization. This happens when two or more countries provide value-added in the good's production sequence with the key aspect of using imported intermediate inputs in producing goods that are again exported, i.e., the existence of the two-way trade of intermediate inputs (Hummels et al., 2001; Kimura et al., 2007) .
The most noticeable incidents of international production networks have so far been registered in East Asia (Kimura et al., 2007) , as a consequence of fragmentation in the Japanese production of electrical machinery, leading to strong increases in twoway trade in parts and components of electrical machinery between Japan and its neighbors (Kimura et al., 2008) .
1 When considering the evidence, one needs to keep in mind that fragmentation along with declining coordination costs represents technical progress 2 that is produced in only a few industrialized economies (Keller, 2004) . Also, we observe poor-country firms specializing in tasks that tend to be routine, homogeneous, and intensive in labor, even in low-skill labor (Breda et al., 2008; Kimura, 2006; Sinn, 2005) . Case study evidence points to machine building and capital-goods production as the industries experiencing the most pronounced international production networking or even offshoring.
From this description, one would expect supply-side country differences to play an effective role as in a factor-proportions setting. Specifically, across Europe one would expect firms in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that entered the EU in 2004 as new members (the EU-10) to specialize in labor-intensive tasks and firms in the old EU members (the EU-15) to specialize in capital-intensive tasks within the chain of production of capital goods. This allocation of tasks would generate two-way trade in the parts and components of capital goods across Europe.
This process could be expected to be the most distinct during the European 1 These phenomena are the most salient in electrical machinery, while intrasectoral input-output relationships across borders are weak in the transport equipment sector. In addition, the basic features of international fragmentation are detected in the chemical and material sectors (Kimura et al., 2008) . 2 This is in the spirit of the notion of capital-good variety describing an economy's state of technology, as proposed in Romer (1990) and tested in Frensch and Gaucaite Wittich (2009). convergence process and also supported by the commencement of that convergence process. 3 European trade in parts and components will form a landscape to empirically test our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a review of the conceptual background for analyzing fragmentation-induced trade in the parts and components of capital goods as a subset of intermediate goods and also earlier empirical results. In section 3, we motivate a gravity-equation model for parts and components trade, based on Haveman and Hummels (2004) , to refine the approach taken in Kimura et al. (2007) . We formulate our estimable specification and describe our data in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Hypotheses, empirical results, and a robustness analysis are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Current state of the conceptual and empirical background

Overview of the relevant trade models
In theoretical models, the potential determinants of specialization within the global supply chain include both comparative advantage and product differentiation together with economies of scale. Approaches associated with new trade theory model imperfect competition on the level of intermediate goods (Egger and Falkinger, 2006; Fujita and Thisse, 2006; Hayakawa, 2007) . Economic geography models (Amiti, 2005; Robert-Nicoud, 2008) aim at resolving the locations of component producers along with the trade-off between agglomeration tendencies and factor prices. Costinot et al. (2011) develop a theory of global supply chains with sequential production subject to mistakes, in which countries with lower probabilities of making mistakes specialize in later stages of production in a unique free-trade equilibrium.
Most prominently, however, the rationalization of patterns of specialization and trade in intermediate products proceeds using traditional models of international trade, dating back to Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) . These models explicitly assume the existence of the costs of coordinating international production with or without explicit reference to networks or offshoring. In particular, models of offshoring can be found to be grounded in Heckscher-Ohlin factor-proportions models of trade (Arndt, 1997; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001; Deardorff, 2001; Egger, 2002; Egger and Falkinger, 2003) , in extended-factor-proportions models of both trade and FDI (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996) , and in specific-factor models (Kohler, 2004) .
Accordingly, international incentives for the specialization of tasks are given by country differences in terms of relative factor endowments or, absent factor price equalization, in terms of factor prices. This was proposed in Grossman and RossiHansberg (2008) , who identify individual tasks as prone to fragmentation and potential offshoring that may be part of the production processes of quite diverse products. From the point of view of capital-rich and/or skill-rich economies, this means that any routine task in any production can potentially be offshored. Assuming that firms are able to use their own technology whenever they opt to offshore parts of production and the cost of heterogeneity of offshoring across a continuum of tasks, Grossmann and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) demonstrate that the costs of offshoring versus wage differences drive the international division of the production chain.
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Empirical evidence that looks at potential determinants of specialization within the international production chain is mixed. Analyzing a subset of offshore activities in terms of the U.S. inward processing trade with the EU, 5 Görg (2000, p. 418) concludes that "the distribution of fragmented production around the globe will be according to countries' comparative advantages." Exploring textile and apparel trade, however, Baldone et al. (2001, p. 102) find that "there is no evidence that the choice of the processing country by EU firms is due to pre-existing comparative advantages." Egger and Egger (2003) broaden the scope of the analysis and show that important roles for Austrian offshoring to the CEE and the former Soviet Union was played by declining tariffs and unit labor costs in the two regions. Marin (2006) presents empirical evidence for the role of institutional influences on offshoring across Europe, based on Austrian and German firms' survey data. Finally, Kimura et al. (2007) Testing the influences of various trade theories against each other within the same gravity specification presupposes that these theories can be reduced to the same gravity specification. Factor proportions theories of trade are usually incomplete specialization models while new theories of trade yield a complete specialization in equilibrium. According to Haveman and Hummels (2004) , due to the adding-up constraints of countries' expenditure systems, for a world with more than two countries a combination of four assumptions suffice to derive the simplest possible bilateral gravity structure. These conditions are: (i) trade is only in final goods, (ii) all trade is frictionless and balanced, (iii) preferences over final goods are identical and homothetic, and (iv) each good is produced in and exported out of only one country, independent of the details on the supply side that give rise to this complete specialization. Under these conditions, the volume of bilateral trade is described by a log-linear equation in both countries' incomes and world income, and there is no scope for "augmenting" the gravity equation.
New or new new theories of trade are based on product differentiation and monopolistic competition and give rise to complete specialization in equilibrium.
Hence, according to these theories trade cannot be represented by gravity equations augmented by adding the absolute values of differences in per capita incomes (Arkolakis et al., 2012) . Under complete specialization, analyzing gross trade flows is simply not informative about the specific driving forces connected to new trade theories or economic geography. This is true even when complete specialization is embedded into factor proportions theory as in Helpman and Krugman (1985) .
Therefore, any scope for augmenting the simplest gravity relationship requires that assumptions (i)-(iv) are violated. As shown in section 3, admitting trade in intermediate goods does not on its own (i.e., under the assumptions of full specialization, identical homothetic technology and frictionless trade) generate bilateral gravity equations augmented by supply-side country differences. Thus, negative coefficients for per capita income differences in augmented gravity equations describing potentially fragmentation-induced gross trade flows simply cannot indicate the presence of new trade theory influences on the data that would be rooted in complete specialization. In fact, as will follow from the analysis below, a gravity specification describing trade flows in parts and components as log-linear in both country sizes and absolute country income differentials does not describe the data well against any theoretical model of trade, i.e., it is mis-specified.
A gravity model of trade in parts and components with incomplete specialization
As outlined in section 2.1, parts and components are often modeled as differentiated products. However, much of the assumed differentiation may in fact be customization on demand within production networks or offshoring relationships (Antràs and Staiger, 2012) . Levchenko (2007) 
Multilateral trade with horizontal fragmentation: Assumptions
We follow the literature by making two distinctions as a point of departure for deriving bilateral gravity equations (see especially Deardorff, 1998; Evenett and Keller, 2002; Haveman and Hummels, 2004) . The distinctions are between complete versus incomplete specialization and between trade incentives versus trade costs.
A full theoretical derivation of bilateral gravity in the presence of trade costs is so far limited to complete specialization cases. In our incomplete specialization
Heckscher-Ohlin framework, we first have to answer how equilibrium can arise in the by distance, one would expect that adding trade costs eliminates all but one supplier of this particular good to this particular country. However, any of the other suppliers may still be the minimum total cost supplier to other countries, given variations in distance between countries. So even if bilateral trade becomes completely specialized in the presence of trade costs, worldwide production does not need to be. General equilibrium specialization and trade is the outcome of total cost minimization as the sum of production and trade costs. In equilibrium there may be a minimum total cost supplier to a particular country that is not the minimum production cost supplier but is close in distance or the other way around. Also, we might have situations of equal minimum total cost suppliers, evoking a rationale for random rationing. Without specifying the technology of overcoming trade barriers, equilibrium diversification and trade are determined by a trade-off between factor endowment and trade cost influences.
While there is no higher dimensional Heckscher-Ohlin theory with trade costs upon which to rest our gravity derivation, this is how we look at it. Specifically, we put a multi-country, multi-product, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin framework into an motivating random rationing à la Deardorff (1998) to decompose countries' multilateral gravity. Finally, adding specific effects in the econometric specification introduces the trade-off between incomplete-specialization forces and service-link costs into bilateral-gravity equations that is behind much of the theoretical motivation for the fragmentation-induced trade cited in section 2. In accordance with the above we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 -technology. Production is horizontally fragmented in the spirit of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) , where firm-specific production technologies are available in all countries. Hence, N tasks are carried out, using two factors of production (capital K and labor L), each of which results in a tradable intermediate good-a part or component. One final good is assembled from these N parts or components. All production is subject to homothetic derived demands.
Assumption 2 -trade costs. We assume an infinitesimally small border effect, but no trade or any other coordination costs.
Assumption 3 -trade balance. Imports of country i from country j (IM ij ) are equal to the exports of country j to country i (EX ji ), IM ij = EX ji .
Multilateral gravity and incomplete specialization in the presence of trade costs
According to Assumption 1, all production is subject to homothetic derived demands, such that all variables can be studied in nominal terms: C is consumption or use, X production, Y income, EX exports, and IM imports. Subscripts denote countries, superscripts goods. Given the existence of N intermediate goods and neglecting primary inputs, parameters denote the allocation of value-added Z to the production of a part or component k in each country j over two stages of production.
Then,
and
such that
With Assumption 1 (homotheticity in production), parameters represent the productivity of parts and components, and describe the distribution of derived demands in nominal terms,
With (2) and (3), the value-added in producing the final good can be written as
Equation (6) describes the output of the final good in country j. Demand is given by spending the total income on the final good, +1 = . Accordingly, the net exports of the final good are described by
For parts and components, output is given in (1) and used in (4), which also holds for the world as a whole, = +1 . With final goods output as described in (6) we
Expression (8) can be simplified using two characteristics of world trade. First, the world version of (7) implies that 1 − ∑ =1 = +1 , as world trade in final goods must always be balanced. Second, world output of any good is always equal to world use, such that
Country j's net exports or imports of part or component k are described by
Hence,
As we are only interested in parts and components trade, we may simplify (11) by assuming balanced final goods trade for each single country, 7 such that
On the basis of (12), countries export a specific part or component if they devote a greater share of the value-added to producing this good than the rest of the world ( > ), or if their part or component is more productive in terms of final output than the rest of the world ( < ). With Assumption 1 (firm-specific technologies are identically available everywhere in the world), we can further simplify (12) to
Summing over all goods k, the net exports of the parts and components of country j to the world are
Selecting export items into set K EXj , country j's multilateral parts and components exports are
Analogously imports are defined as,
By extending the descriptions of trade only in final goods in Haveman and Hummels (2004) to trade in parts and components in this way, equations (15) and (16) Exports and imports exhibit unitary elasticities with respect to the country income provided specialization patterns are uncorrelated with income.
As an intermediate step we proceed with the simple version of bilateral trade in parts and components with complete specialization, when each part or component is exclusively supplied by one country. Hence, good k imports of country i from the world are in fact the good k imports of country i from some country j. As country i uses all the parts and components supplied by country j, this decomposition of multilateral trade straightforwardly implies bilateral trade in parts and components with complete specialization as log-linear in both countries' incomes. 
Bilateral trade under incomplete specialization
In contrast to the simple complete specialization case, with incomplete specialization and no further cost of trade considered, it is not possible to strictly analytically decompose (15) and (16) into bilateral trade relationships. However, (15) and (16) together imply the two following results that represent conditions subject to which bilateral parts and components trade relationships will be distributed in a statistical sense in a sample of countries.
Result 2. For bilateral trade to occur, countries' specialization patterns as described in (15) and (16) must be complementary. Hence, there must be at least one k that is both exported by country j and imported by country i.
Result 3.
Equations (15) and (16) describe countries' multilateral trade, i.e., the expected values of bilateral relationships. Thus, (15) and (16) can be expected to be met on the average in all bilateral trading relationships.
Results 2 and 3 together already allow for qualitative predictions for bilateral trade relationships. First, larger countries trade more on average. Using Result 1, in a sample of heterogeneous countries, larger countries can indeed be expected to trade more with each other. Hence, the bilateral parts and components trade volume will increase with the product of trading countries' incomes (Y j ×Y i ). Second, countries that are more specialized against the world average trade more on average. Thus, in a sample of heterogeneous countries, countries that are more specialized vis-à-vis the world can be expected to trade more parts and components with each other provided that their specialization is complementary.
Combining our Result 1 with previous results from the literature allows us to derive the most important result of this section in the form of a bilateral-gravity framework constrained on countries' multilateral specialization patterns reflecting factor endowments or factor prices.
Result 4. With incomplete specialization, bilateral trade in parts and components is log-linear in both countries' incomes and their specific supply-side differences with respect to the world. Formally,
where w j , w i , and w w represent countries' and world-average supply-side characteristics either in the form of capital-labor or wage-rental ratios.
The remainder of this section derives Result 4, by combining Result 1 with the previous literature to analyze the interaction between factor endowments/prices and border effects within a gravity framework viewing bilateral trade equations as statistical relationships constrained on countries' multilateral specialization patterns.
In particular, we make use of Deardorff's (1998) random choice argument, which in our context states that a country's customers, due to small border effects, prefer their home part or component to foreign ones, but are indifferent between foreign-produced parts or components. Hence, good k imports of country i from country j are given by country i's worldwide imports of k times country j's share in worldwide exports of k.
Formally,
Incentives driving countries' bilateral trade under incomplete specialization must match our underlying Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Following the derivation of Result 1, consider again that worldwide exports of part or component k out of country j are given by = ( − ). We now interpret this multilateral gravity equation between country j and world w as a bilateral gravity equation between two countries j and w. Then, using the argument put forward in Evenett and Keller (2002, p. 286) , in a 2×2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin world, if country j is relatively capital-rich and part or component k is capital intensive, value-added is positively related to country j's capital-labor ratio κ j = (K/L) j , and is inversely related to w's capitallabor ratio, κ w = (K/L) w . Hence, the volume of trade increases in the difference between capital-labor ratios, (κ j -κ w ), such that
Analogously, we can write ∝ ( − ) for relatively labor-rich country i exporting the labor-intensive part or component and importing the capitalintensive k. Accordingly, for any two countries j and i, capital-rich and labor-rich relative to the world w, respectively,
as ∑ is given for each particular country.
According to Ethier (1985) , the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem carries through to the case of more than two goods, such that specialization patterns between countries j and w and countries w and i continue to be shaped by differences in capital-labor ratios, at least in terms of correlations. Deardorff (1979) shows that, in a two-country, two-factor model, trade in more than two goods accords with the ranking of goods by factor intensity if there are unequal factor prices, as long as there is no connection between trade in final goods and intermediate goods. Different factor prices should be the rule in our context due to infinitesimally small home country effects. As we have derived Result 1 on trade in parts and components without reference to trade in final goods, country j will export the more capital intensive parts and components if country j is capital-richer than country w and if its wage-rental ratio is higher than that in country w. Thus, the predictive power of � − � for exports from country j to country w continues to hold. We can, however, generalize that for exports from capital-rich country j to country w in fact � − � has predictive power, where w j and w w represent supply-side differences either in the form of capital-labor or wage-rental ratios. The analogous reasoning can be applied to labor-rich country i imports from w, so we can generalize proportionality (15) to the multi-product case, to describe total imports to labor-rich i from capital-rich j, with or without factor price equalization. Finally, according to Assumption 3 (IM ij = EX ji ), equation (17), as stated in Result 4, indeed holds.
Empirical specification
General outline
Combining our results from the previous section now allows us to specify a testable bilateral gravity equation. For any pair in a sample of heterogeneous countries we reformulate Result 4 in terms of absolute values. Hence, (17) directly translates into a log-linear relationship:
Specification (21) trade volumes are expected to increase with the product of countries' respective supply-side differences against the world, � -
specification (21) captures the fact that bilateral trade flows will increase with relative, rather than absolute, supply-side country differences.
However, the problem with the above formulation is the potential absence of complementary specialization in Result 3 above: relative supply-side country differences � -� × � -� predict large trade volumes also for countries that lack complementary specialization. We solve this problem by introducing dummy variables to account for bilateral parts and components trade relationships between countries that are expected to be characterized by complementary specialization. This assignment should be done based on a priori information about the values of the supply-side country differences, e.g., on the basis of w j > w w and w i < w w . Since our empirical analysis is performed on European trade data, we introduce a dummy variable DummyEU15/10 that equals one for trade relationships between an EU-15 (old) and an EU-10 (new) country and zero otherwise. Specifically, within a panel of data on EU-25 countries, bilateral trade in parts and components (EX(PC) ji,t ) can be described, so far without accounting for trade barriers, by the following specification:
9 Haveman and Hummels' (2004) basis for their econometric specification of bilateral trade is
I.e., larger countries can be expected to trade more with each other, controlling for their specialization patterns, which they ad hoc proxy by specialization sources in terms of partner countries' capital-labor ratios, relative to world averages.
Trade barriers and gravity specification for bilateral trade in parts and components with incomplete specialization
Traditional gravity approaches explicitly cope with different trade barriers, i.e., distance (to proxy transport costs), geographic contiguity, cultural proximity, and the like. However, the relevant discussion on using gravity frameworks (Cheng and Wall, 2005; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006) recommends making use of the panel structure of available trade data. The specific purpose is to incorporate trade barriers under timeinvariant country-pair-specific as well as country-pair-invariant time-specific omitted variables to be controlled for by appropriate fixed effects. In terms of trade barriers, this procedure has the advantage over traditional procedures of also controlling for countries' multilateral trade resistance (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) .
Hence, the procedure has the intuitively appealing notion that bilateral trade barriers should always be measured relative to the world, in a similar fashion as trade incentives in the form of supply-side country differences described above. An implication is that, given fixed trade barriers between countries j and i, then the higher the trade barriers of a country j with respect to the world, the more the country j will be driven to trade with country i.
The estimable specification is rooted in our model described in section 3 and accounts for the issues raised in section 4.1. It takes the following simple form of a gravity model:
Exogenous (to our model), technical progress through decreasing coordination costs and ongoing fragmentation can be represented by time effects. Nevertheless, our motivation of fragmentation and the trade it induces does not imply a high degree of substitutability but rather complementarity between technical progress and the possibility of using supply-side country differences. Hence, we model this by interacting the combined variable 15/10 log�� , -, � × � , -, �� with time-period effects. For this purpose, we divide the sample period (1992-2008) into five sub-periods of (almost) equal length. 
Estimation strategy
Specification (23) is estimated on unbalanced panel data with a mean time length of about 10 years. We proxy capital-labor ratios by GDP per capita and wage-rental ratios by wages, assuming much lower variation in interest rates than in wages across Europe. 11 In specification (23) we use time-invariant asymmetric country-pairspecific effects (c ij ) to capture the fixed effects between exporting and importing countries that do not change over time. In general, researchers prefer using a pairwise fixed effects model because the individual effects could be correlated with the explanatory variables; this potential correlation of the fixed effects and right-handside variables can lead to inconsistent estimates, especially in a dynamic setting.
Moreover, a pairwise fixed-effects model absorbs all time-invariant regressors that characterize the relationship between an exporter and importer. Further, pairwise fixed effects estimation has an advantage by eliminating potential omitted variable bias. Finally, by using a pairwise fixed-effects model we are able to account for the multilateral trade resistance issue broadly discussed in the literature.
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In order to obtain consistent estimates we employ a dynamic panel-data model following the approaches of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell et al. (2000) . The estimator is implemented in STATA 12 as an xtdpd command and it uses moment conditions in which the lagged levels of the dependent and predetermined variables serve as instruments for the differenced equation. We begin our estimation by performing a Hausman-type specification test to assess the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables by comparing a standard fixed effects model with the Arellano-Bond-Bover-Blundell technique.
10 Navaretti and Venables (2004) , among others, show that fragmentation is a necessary condition for countries starting to engage in production-process vertical division of labor to utilize the advantage of location differences. 11 Amiti and Davis (2011) analyze the impact of trade liberalization on wages by accounting for firmlevel heterogeneity in trade behavior as well as the large and growing importance of trade in intermediate products. 12 For details on the use of relative price differences dealing with multilateral trade resistance in gravity-type specifications see Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) . Feenstra (2004) shows that including country-pair dummies generates about the same effect as using relative price differences.
As the test confirms the endogeneity of explanatory variables we proceed with instrumentation. We estimate the theoretically motivated specification (23) Bond (1998).
Data
Bilateral trade in parts and components EX(PC) ji describes the exports of parts and components from country j to country i over the period 1992-2008. The data were compiled from the United Nations COMTRADE database. The definition of the parts and components of capital goods follows the BEC categorization of the UN Statistics.
Our data cover 24 EU countries, which leads to 552 (23 x 24) importer-exporter country pairs. 13 Our data do not contain zero-trade flows; hence, we do not need to apply the two-stage estimation procedure suggested in Helpman et al. (2008) . The details on the data and variables used are provided in Tables 1 and B. 1.
In our estimation we employ three different measures of bilateral trade in parts and components. First, we measure the trade flows of how much country j exports to country i, which is identical to how much country i imports from country j. World GDP per capita at current prices and world average wage (w w ) is measured as the mean GDP per capita in the world and the mean wage in the world, respectively; the world is defined by our full reporting sample described in Appendix Population data were obtained from World Development Indicators. With these variables we construct relative supply-side country differences in GDP per capita and
Given that specification (23) is rooted in factorproportion models of incomplete specialization and trade, existing wage differences may be subject to factor price equalization tendencies by the very trade they induce.
14 As factor-price differences may not be strictly exogenous, we follow Arellano and Bond (1991) and apply the simplest possible remedy in choosing the second lags of the explanatory variables as instruments.
The time-specific effects in (23) also control for each year's data using a different numéraire since GDP and trade values are all current (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006) , where original USD-denominated data are converted to euros.
Empirical Results
A priori expectations and benchmark results
Our key results are based on estimates from specification (23) that are explicitly rooted in incomplete specialization. Hence, we can form a priori expectations on some coefficients and formulate testable hypotheses. First, we state Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1:
The bilateral parts and components trade volume will increase with the product of trading countries' incomes; formally we test whether β 1 > 0.
As equations (15) and (16) describe the expected values of bilateral trade relationships, we may even expect β 1 to equal one, provided the extent of specialization is uncorrelated with income.
Second, we state Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2:
The volume of trade is related to the extent of supply-side country differences relative to the world.
However, we cannot form an a priori expectation about the value of β 2 without further information on the sample of countries. If the sample is heterogeneous in terms of complementary specialization, we expect β 2 > 0. If the sample is sufficiently homogenous, with, say, all w i > w w , then there is no reason to assume the majority of country pairs to be complementarily specialized. In this case higher deviations of both countries' specialization incentives from world averages, i.e., higher � -� × � -�, will generate less parts and components trade, such that β 2 < 0.
Third, if a complementary specialization can be derived from the data then the dummy variable DummyEU15/10 in specification (23) would capture the "right" country pairs with complementary specialization. For that case, we state Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3:
The volume of trade will increase with the extent of truly complementary specialization between countries; formally we test whether γ s > 0.
Since the interactive term 15/10 log�� , -, � × � , -, �� is estimated separately for five sub-periods over the period 1992-2008, we obtain five coefficients γ s . This set of coefficients enables us to capture the dynamic effects.
Finally, we state Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 4:
The volume of trade will increase with the degree of specialization between the new and old EU countries.
Hypothesis 4 is assessed via the net effect of the relative supply-side country differences that is captured by the sum of the coefficients (β 2 + γ s ). A positive value of the sum favors the above idea of intra-European specialization. For the natural limiting case of complete specialization, we would not find specialization patterns to play any role, in which case β 2 = γ s = 0. In fact, complete specialization is in principle compatible with both (new) new theories of trade, based on monopolistic competition models of trade as well as Heckscher-Ohlin with trade costs or for substantial differences in endowments. However, Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) find evidence of similar factor endowments among large parts of our country sample, to potentially enable them to produce the same set of goods. Heckscher-Ohlin-based simulation results in Haveman and Hummels (2004) with infinitesimally small trade costs changing the ordering of minimum cost suppliers without changing prices give rise to incomplete specialization in the sense of more than one country in the world producing and exporting one particular good to the rest of the world and each supplier country supplying a particular good to more than one customer country. On this basis, we will identify our limiting case of β 2 = γ s = 0 as complete specialization based on monopolistic competition models of trade, indicating trade in variants of differentiated products rather than in different homogenous products.
We introduce our benchmark results based on specification (23) in the first columns of Table 2 and 3 (flows) , where we present the estimated coefficients for the dependent variables of bilateral parts and components trade introduced in section 4.3.
Each table contains estimates for a specific variable described earlier that represents supply-side country differences: wages (Table 2 ) and GDP per capita to proxy capitallabor ratios (Table 3) . The results for both types of variables are not materially different. The key fact is that our results provide evidence for trade in parts and components of capital goods due to the existence of multinational production networks across Europe, and inform about the driving forces identified already in the first section.
First, the statistically significant coefficients β 1 demonstrate that larger countries trade more with each other. Second, the negative coefficients β 2 confirm that our sample of European countries on average in fact features a rather homogeneous specialization pattern in the international production chain as compared to the world average. This seems to confirm the results in Kimura et al. (2007) in that European trade in parts and components is based on monopolistic competition models of trade, indicating trade in variants of differentiated products rather than in different homogenous products. However, this average pattern does not reveal the significant role for specialization incentives across Europe, as becomes evident when we compare the coefficient β 2 with always significantly positive and much larger coefficients γ s . The sums of the coefficient pairs β 2 and γ s (β 2 + γ 1 for the first period 1992-1995, β 2 + γ 2 for the second period 1996-1998, etc.) show that relative supplyside country differences do drive trade in parts and components across Europe. This trade is compatible with models of incomplete specialization and trade, but only between the original EU-15 and the ten accession countries (EU-10), rather than within each of the two country groups. Specifically, when measuring relative supplyside country differences by wages (Table 2) , parts and components trade flows between East and West Europe react with an elasticity growing from about 8% (β 2 + γ 1 ) to some 15% (β 2 + γ 4 ). When population-weighted averages are used (Table 4 ) the trade flows react with even larger elasticity growth from about 15% (β 2 + γ 1 ) to about 21% (β 2 + γ 4 ). Measuring relative supply-side country differences by per capita GDP (Table 3) brings elasticities to a range between 9% and 13%, or 13-16% for results accounting for population weights (Table 5) EU-10 countries catch up with the EU-15 so that supply-side country differences between both groups, relative to the world, become less pronounced. This may well be affected by the technological progress in the EU-10 countries that is closely linked to foreign direct investment and multinationals (Uzagalieva et al., 2012) . As foreignowned subsidiaries become a part of the innovation systems and the industrial structure of the EU-10 countries, they promote overall technological growth in the region that further contributes to catch-up with the EU-15.
Finally, as part of robustness checks (see section 6.2), we plot the confidence intervals of the coefficients estimated from specification (23) in Figure 1 . Black and white bars depict simple and weighted means, respectively. Based on the coefficients' values (vertical axis) and their confidence intervals it is clearly evident that sum of the coefficients associated with development of the specialization (β 2 + γ s ) is for all five considered periods statistically greater than zero. This property of the coefficients directly implies that specialization patterns of the EU-15 and EU-10 countries were complementary during the period under research.
Robustness
Tables 2 and 3 already confirm that the relative supply-side country differences that generate trade in parts and components across Europe do not depend on the measurement of these differences, either as wages or as GDP per capita.
As already discussed in Debaere (2003) , measuring world averages in relative supply-side country differences matters a lot. So far, world average wages and GDP per capita have been measured as simple averages in the world defined by our full reporting sample described in Appendix Tables 2 and 3 . Hence, our results are also robust to this change in measurement.
Finally, we complement our robustness results by a statistical comparison of the coefficients derived from the estimated specification (23) where wages serve as a measure for supply-side country differences. These are coefficients presented in Table   2 (simple averages) and Table 4 (weighted averages). In Figure 1 we present the plots of the confidence intervals of the above coefficients. Black and white bars depict simple and weighted means, respectively. The shapes of the white bars reflect the lower dispersion due to weighting. The three graphs in Figure 1 show that there is ample overlap of the confidence intervals of coefficients. Hence, our results are in a statistical sense robust to the world average measurement in terms of simple or weighted averages.
Trade margins and conjectures on links to the offshoring literature
The results of the previous section provide evidence that the East-West part of the European trade in parts and components is driven by trade-offs between location advantages and coordination costs, relative to the rest of the world. As Kimura et al. (2007) do for East Asia, we take this as evidence for the existence of supply chains in the form of international production networks across Europe. While this in itself does not constitute evidence for outright offshoring of labor-intensive tasks from West European to East European firms, we may conclude from the literature cited in section 2.1 that this is what happens regularly. Accordingly, in this section we will interpret trade in parts and components between East and West Europe as being offshore related.
Based on the highly disaggregated nature of our original trade data (see Appendix A for data details) we decompose the influences on parts and components trade along the two margins of trade, i.e., along extensive (number of exported goods) versus intensive (average volumes per exported good) import margins. This reveals that trade in parts and components across Europe is predominantly realized along the intensive margin in response to market size increases, but along the extensive margin in response to stronger relative supply-side country differences, i.e., more offshorerelated trade between the EU-15 and the EU-10 in response to stronger relative supply-side country differences may have resulted predominantly from the offshoring of new activities rather than extending the scale of already-offshore activities.
The above results have important implications in terms of wages. According to Bergin et al. (2011) , recent new offshoring from the EU-15 to the EU-10 may, ceteris paribus, have increased employment volatility in the new EU. The margin distinction, however, may also be of relevance for wages in the home country. Estimating Mincertype wage equations augmented by offshoring treatment effects to firm-level data, demonstrate that offshoring low-skill tasks decreases the wages of German low-skill employees. Comparing wage and employment effects across countries features significant differences in this respect, which may be motivated by different labor market institutions, as suggested in .
Our results may be related to an alternative explanation for the internationally varying labor-market effects of offshoring, however. Empirical work on the labormarket effects of offshoring has so far been mainly guided by the theoretical framework of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , in which offshoring is costless or uniformly costly across discrete sets of tasks, predicting the effects indeed identified in . More recent theoretical work, however, generalizes Feenstra and Hanson (1996) by introducing task-specific trade costs that potentially limit the offshoring of a continuum of tasks (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008 ).
More offshoring of low-skill tasks, made possible by decreasing coordination costs over all tasks, then ceteris paribus implies a positive productivity effect in the source country, which appears strongest in those firms that have already offshored the most, and which therefore carries the highest potential benefits for the skill groups hit hardest by offshoring. The labor market effects that disadvantage the skill groups hit hardest by offshoring, as already identified in Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , are thus counterbalanced and may even be dominated under certain conditions. Firms that have already offshored most tasks are increasingly likely to strengthen alreadyexisting relationships rather than create new offshoring relationships. In our trade terminology, existing offshoring relationships, in turn, get strengthened along the intensive margin, as opposed to strengthening along the extensive margin by new relationships. One might therefore suspect the unambiguous results of to hold for offshoring relationships that get predominantly strengthened along the extensive margin, rather than along the intensive margin. With the caveat of our using disaggregated macro rather than micro data, this, in turn, seems to be the case for the offshoring relationship between the EU-15 and the EU-10, i.e., the "old" and the "new" EU members. In the spirit of the Grosssman Rossi-Hansberg (2008) approach, this would suggest the conjecture that recent waves of offshoring activities from "old" to "new" EU members might have hurt (low-skill) workers in the old EU, perhaps more so than old EU offshoring elsewhere.
Conclusions
This study started by stating that analyzing gross trade flows in parts and components with gravity equations augmented by ad hoc measures of supply-side country differences appear to be mis-specified, due to theoretically unmotivated attempts to allow for both complete and incomplete specialization influences on parts and components trade within the same gravity framework. We develop an appropriate gravity framework, rooted in the incomplete-specialization version from HeckscherOhlin, that views bilateral parts and components trade gravity equations as statistical relationships constrained on countries' multilateral specialization patterns and allows this trade to increase with fragmentation, declining coordination costs, and multilateral incentives to specialization, and also to decline with trade resistance.
Complete specialization emerges as a natural limiting case with specialization patterns playing no role.
We apply this framework to a truly Europe-wide sample of countries, while fully accounting for potential tendencies towards factor price equalization via trade.
We find no evidence for the average bilateral European parts and components trade relationship to be driven by countries' multilateral specialization incentives, as expressed by relative (to the rest of the world) supply-side country differences.
However, we do find this evidence for parts and components trade relationships between EU-15 and EU-10 countries, together with a positive influence for technical progress in terms of declining coordination costs and ongoing fragmentation and a negative impact of multilateral trade resistance. Analogous to Kimura et al. (2007) 's conclusion on East Asia, we take this as evidence for the existence of international production networks across Europe, driven by trade-offs between wages and coordination costs.
In particular, the results do not contradict Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) , where firms' decisions about offshoring and trade in parts and components are embedded in an environment of incomplete factor price equalization, firm-level technologies, and the cost heterogeneity of offshoring across a continuum of tasks, and are thus compatible with the view that offshoring need not hurt (low-skill) workers, as long as offshoring relationships get strengthened along the intensive margin as opposed to the extensive margin. In as much as international production networks across Europe are shaped by the outright offshoring of labor-intensive tasks from West to East, our results, however, suggest that exactly this strengthening along the extensive margin by creating new relationships might have been happening recently when extending offshoring from the EU-15 to the EU-10.
Extensions of this paper may better reflect the influence of declining coordination costs, so far proxied by sub-period fixed effects. More realistic attempts should aim at measuring trade liberalization or institutional variation especially with respect to the labor market . Notes to Tables 2-5 : Variables are defined in Table 1 . Fixed effects not reported, t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
